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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-
conviction relief.   
First, the court appointed counsel for the pro se Petitioner at his request, 
but then did not allow counsel to withdraw after he had been discharged 
repeatedly by Mr. Hawkins. The court did not even rule on the renewed motions 
for withdrawal of counsel or hold requested hearings even though the duty to 
inquire was triggered.  
Second, the Court detailed the record from the criminal case, but failed to 
ever take judicial notice of it, and it was not otherwise made part of the post-
conviction record.  Accordingly, there was actually no record upon which the 
court could  base its dismissal.  
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At over ten years and counting, this case and its background defies 
succinct  description.  The Idaho Supreme Court described the proceedings in 
the criminal case in its opinion in State v. Hawkins, 159 Idaho 507 (2015): 
In January of 2008, a jury convicted Hawkins of two counts of 
robbery. At trial, Hawkins admitted that he robbed banks but 
claimed that he did so under duress that stemmed from his 
previous involvement with various government agencies, including 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA). Subsequently, the Court of Appeals determined that 
the district court  erred when it did not "sua sponte order a 
psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing . . . ." State v. 
Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(emphasis original) [hereafter Hawkins I]. The Court of Appeals 
vacated Hawkins' judgment of conviction and remanded the case 
so that Hawkins could undergo a competency evaluation pursuant 
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to Idaho Code sections 18-211 and 18-212. Id. Significantly, the 
Court of Appeals opinion stated: 
Because it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was 
tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave 
the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent 
to stand trial. 
Id. 
On remand, the district court conducted a competency hearing on 
November 12, 2010, where it heard testimony from licensed 
psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr. 
Michael Estess. Both experts had evaluated Hawkins and 
determined that Hawkins was competent during the entire course of 
his legal proceedings. In its order of December 6, 2010, the district 
court found that Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January of 
2008 (the 2010 competency determination). However, the district 
court determined that the above-quoted language from the Court of 
Appeals was the law of the case  and required it to retry the case. 
The State successfully moved for leave to pursue a permissive 
interlocutory appeal to this Court. 
On appeal, this Court reversed the district court's decision, holding 
that "[n]either the law of the case doctrine nor I.A.R. 38 prevents 
the district court from making a retroactive competency 
determination as to Hawkins in this case." State v. Hawkins, 155 
Idaho 69, 75, 305 P.3d 513, 519 (2013) [hereafter Hawkins II]. Due 
to the narrow issue presented by the permissive appeal, we did not 
address Hawkins' claim that the 2010 competency determination 
violated Hawkins' due process rights. Id. at 74-75, 305 P.3d at 518-
19. 
On remand, the State filed a motion asking the district court to take 
judicial notice of its 2010 competency determination. The district 
court granted the State's request to take judicial notice of the 
evidence that led to its 2010 competency determination and 
determined that it was appropriate to conduct another competency 
hearing to give Hawkins the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses and present expert testimony. The district court 
presumed that its previous determination that Hawkins was 
competent was correct, but it stated this "presumption" would be 
"subject to cross-examination and hearing from [Hawkins'] expert." 




Id. p. 509-510.  
 
 
The Supreme Court continued: 
On June 6, 2013, Hawkins' retained counsel moved that Hawkins 
be declared a needy person for the purpose of hiring an expert 
witness. The district court granted the motion and instructed 
Hawkins' counsel to "direct any specific requests for services to this 
Court for prior approval." On June 28, 2013, Hawkins' attorney 
moved for leave to withdraw because Hawkins no longer wished for 
the attorney to represent him. At hearing, Hawkins expressed his 
desire to proceed pro se. The district court stated Hawkins' desire 
to represent himself was a "conundrum," explaining that Hawkins' 
pro se representation in a hearing where his main argument was 
that he was incompetent "creates a real conflict in the court's way 
of looking at this thing." The district court again explained to 
Hawkins that he had the right to a public defender and conducted 
an extensive Faretta inquiry. The district court granted Hawkins' 
request to proceed pro se and appointed the public defender to 
serve as standby counsel. 
Afterwards, Hawkins filed many pro se motions. At a status 
conference on July 17, 2013, the district court acknowledged these 
motions but deferred ruling on them because  the "sole issue" 
before it was whether Hawkins was competent to stand trial in 
2008. Hawkins informed the district court that he had not 
subpoenaed Dr. Estess for cross-examination and that he had not 
met with Dr. Claude Robert Cloninger, the psychiatrist that Hawkins 
wished to hire as an expert witness. The district court warned 
Hawkins that his competency hearing was rapidly approaching and 
that Hawkins needed to subpoena witnesses so that they could 
testify at the hearing. 
Another status conference was held two weeks later. Hawkins told 
the district court that he had contacted Dr. Cloninger by email and 
that Dr. Cloninger was "awaiting verification for payment." In 
response to questioning, Hawkins informed the district court that 
Dr. Cloninger's fee was $450 an hour and that he would have to be 
compensated for travel and lodging because he resided in St. 
Louis, Missouri. The district court found that using public funds to 
pay for Dr. Cloninger was "not reasonable" and vacated the 
competency hearing scheduled for August 29, 2013. 
On August 13, 2013, the district court issued a written order where 
it found that the costs for obtaining Dr. Cloninger "could easily 
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exceed $20,000." The district court stated that it had reviewed "the 
State Board of Medicine list of psychologists and psychiatrists" and 
determined that "there are many qualified experts in this field in the 
Boise, Nampa, Caldwell and Twin Falls area that could provide 
expert opinion to the Court regarding the defendant's competency 
to proceed now and retroactively." The district court ordered 
Hawkins to submit to an examination by a local expert, disclose his 
choice of expert by August 29, 2013, and submit to examination 
within thirty days of the date of disclosure. The order further 
provided that "[f]ailure of the defendant to submit to examination 
within this time period will preclude the defendant from presenting 
expert witness testimony at the retroactive competency hearing." 
The order also noted, but did not decide, various other motions 
Hawkins had filed. The district court did, however, deny Hawkins' 
motion to strike Dr. Estess' testimony "because there is no basis in 
fact or law to grant such a motion." . . . .  
On October 7, 2013, the district court issued an order setting a 
hearing for October 17, 2013, to "select  a psychologist/psychiatrist 
to evaluate the defendant." The order further provided that "[i]n the 
event the defendant does not submit in writing prior to the hearing 
his selection of a psychologist/psychiatrist the court then will make 
the selection." 
Hawkins did not notify the district court of his selection before the 
October 17th hearing. At the hearing Hawkins, once again, told the 
district court that he wanted Dr. Cloninger to evaluate him. The 
district court then stated that it would appoint Dr. Robert Engle to 
evaluate Hawkins and Hawkins responded that he would not 
participate in an evaluation by Dr. Engle. After a break to confer 
with standby counsel, Hawkins requested a seven-day continuance 
so that he could have time to decide whether his standby counsel 
would become attorney of record. The district court denied this 
request, explaining that "[t]his has been going on since April." The 
district court again took a recess to give Hawkins time to confer 
with standby counsel. Before recessing, the district court outlined 
three options for Hawkins, stating: 
[I]f [standby counsel] is going to be your counsel, I'll give him 
an opportunity to go out in the community, find a psychiatrist 
or psychologist and testify on your behalf. And that's not 
going to be revocable on your part. He is going to be your 
counsel. 
Or Option 2 is that you submit to Dr. Engle's evaluation. The 
court would appoint Dr. Engle, and he would be given an 
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opportunity to evaluate you, submit a report to the court, 
[and] proceed accordingly. 
Or Option 3, if you decline to submit to an evaluation by Dr. 
Engle, the court then will sentence you here forthwith today. 
Following the recess, Hawkins informed the district court that he 
had decided to be represented by standby counsel and suggested 
that his parents might be able to retain Dr. Cloninger. The district 
court stated that it was "not going to proceed down that path" 
without Hawkins showing that his parents had committed to pay Dr. 
Cloninger. The district court reiterated its decision that Hawkins 
would not be able to "fire" his attorney if he elected to be 
represented and that the district court would not condition the 
appointment of counsel  on Hawkins' ability to hire Dr. Cloninger. 
Hawkins evidently became angry and stated: "Then you should just 
sentence me today." After determining that standby counsel did not 
have difficulty communicating with Hawkins during their "brief 
discussions," and that Hawkins was not on any psychotropic 
medications, the district court proceeded to sentencing. The district 
court then found as follows: 
Well, the court will find from the totality of the record that Mr. 
Hawkins, particularly in light of the extensive motions that he 
has filed since this was submitted back to the court in April of 
this year . . . is competent, and he understands the nature of 
the proceeding, that he has made a decision, and I find him to 
have made a knowing and intelligent decision to continue to 
insist that a psychiatrist from St. Louis, Missouri, be 
appointed to testify on his behalf for his articulated basis for 
not appointing that psychiatrist, that there have been 
numerous delays caused as a result of again Mr. Hawkins['] . 
. . failure to follow through with the court's specific order. The 
court will find that there has been ample opportunity afforded 
to Mr. Hawkins to present evidence to the court regarding his 
mental status at his trial in 2007 [sic]. 
The court will find that the testimony and evidence presented 
to the court by Dr. Estess that Mr. Hawkins was competent to 
stand trial, that he was at the time of his evaluation by both 
Dr. Sombke and Dr. Estess was capable of understanding the 
proceedings, assisting in his defense, and that that remains 
the case today. 
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The district court then re-imposed Hawkins' original sentence, 
consisting of concurrent unified life sentences, with thirty years 
fixed. Hawkins timely appealed. 
 
Id. at 510-512.  
 
 The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the district court.  
 On February 13, 2015, Mr. Hawkins timely filed a pro se form verified 
petition for post-conviction relief with attachments.  (R. p. 6-75.)  He also filed a 
motion and affidavit in support of appointment of counsel. (R. p. 76-78.) 
The state brought a motion to dismiss arguing the petition was untimely 
which it later withdrew because it was timely filed. (R. p. 80-81, 83-84, 89-90.)  
 Mr. Hawkins filed what purported to be a Rule 35 motion, but the court 
determined that it belonged in the instant case. (R. p. 86-87, 100-101.)  
The court appointed counsel. (R. p. 93.) Mr. Hawkins filed a pro se 
objection to the state’s motion to dismiss and motion to correct record with 
attachments. (R. p. 94-96,  97-98.)  The court entered an order stating that no 
action would be taken on the objection since the state had withdrawn its motion 
to dismiss. (R. p. 105.)      
The state then filed a new response to the petition for post-conviction relief 
and motion to dismiss. (R. p. 106-109.)   Next, the state moved to suspend the 
proceedings until the last Supreme Court appeal was concluded (and it was 
suspended). (R. p. 110-111.) 
Appointed conflict counsel then entered his appearance. (R. p. 113.)  
The court then issued an order directing the clerk not to file any pro se 
documents from Mr. Hawkins since he was represented and ordered that they 
instead be sent to counsel who can decide whether to file them. (R. p. 115.) 
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Some six months after his appointment, on September 28, 2015, 
appointed counsel filed a Motion to Include Affidavit in Pro Se Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. (R. p. 125.)  Appointed counsel explained that Mr. Hawkins 
sent his pro se affidavit to the court, but it was not filed and was instead sent to 
appointed counsel who was now filing it. (R. p. 125-126.) 
The motion continued: 
Counsel for Petitioner has repeatedly been discharged or fired by 
Hawkins. A motion to withdraw is forthcoming. However, it is 
counsel's belief that the attached petition is relevant to the pro se 
petition for relief now on file. Counsel would ask that this affidavit 
be considered by the court in consideration of the claims now made 
by Petitioner in this action. 
 
Motion to Include Affidavit in Pro Se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at p. 2. (R. 
p. 126.) 
 At the same time, appointed counsel filed his Motion and Affidavit for 
Leave to Withdraw as Counsel.  As grounds, appointed counsel stated that Mr. 
Hawkins had expressed dissatisfaction with counsel, and he desired counsel no 
longer represent him and that there was a lack of cooperation from Mr. Hawkins 
that precluded counsel from adequately representing him. (R. p. 129-130.) 
At a hearing on February 17, 2016, the court denied the motion to 
withdraw as counsel (further detailed below). The court also suggested  
appointed counsel file an amended petition for post-conviction relief.  
On March 11, 2016, appointed counsel filed a notice of lodging Pleadings 
of Faron Hawkins and Renewed Motion to Withdraw. (R. p. 140.)  Attached, inter 
alia,  were Mr. Hawkins’ Notice of Appeal of Judge Bail’s Ruling to Not Remove 
Lawyer [appointed counsel] for and Failure to Hold a Hearing As Required by 
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Law, Decision, State v. Bias, as well as Complaint for Injunctive, Declaratory, 
Compensatory, Punitive Damages and Investigation, Charges for Ongoing 
Criminal Enterprise with Admission! ITCA Filed Timely "Demand for Jury Trial"- 
Motion this Court to Take Judicial Notice of ACLU Suit CVOC-1510240, CRFE-
2007-5. (R. p. 140-141.) According to appointed counsel, this last action names 
him as one of the many defendants. (R. p. 141.) 
On March 11, 2016, appointed counsel filed a motion requesting that the 
court’s order prohibiting pro se filings be rescinded because Mr. Hawkins was 
filing pleadings that were adverse to appointed counsel and had told the court 
that he wanted to proceed pro se or have other counsel, but the court denied 
counsel’s motion to withdraw. (R. p. 226.)  Counsel argued that he cannot be 
placed in the position of having to decide whether to file documents when it could 
create a conflict of interest in the representation. (R. p. 227.)  A hearing was 
requested.  
Appointed counsel then lodged more pleadings of Faron Hawkins 
consisting of over 100 pages, some of which concerned Mr. Hawkins’ attempts to 
remove appointed counsel. (R. p. 229-230, 232-234, 242.) 
On April 26, 2016, the state filed an answer, a motion for summary 
disposition and brief in support, and a motion to take judicial notice of a specific 
motion to suppress and transcript from a motion to suppress hearing. (R. p. 328,   
330, 346-364.)  The state characterized the claims as follows: 
In his pro se petition, Hawkins makes approximately 46 claims. The 
claims fall under  six  types: 1) Errors made by the court, 2) 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 3) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 4) 
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Denial of his right to a Speedy Trial, 5) Errors related to the return 
of his indictment, 6) Additional claims. 
 
R. p. 352.1  
On May 4, 2016, appointed counsel filed an affidavit in support of a 
renewed motion to withdraw as counsel which stated as follows in relevant part: 
4. That I am unable to effectively communicate with, or establish 
any attorney client relationship with Mr. Hawkins; 
 
5. Per the Courts Order of February 17, 2016 my office did prepare 
a proposed supplemental amended petition for relief. I mailed that 
to Mr. Hawkins on April 8, 2016.  I have not received any response 
from Mr. Hawkins;  
 
6. Mr. Hawkins continues to file pro se motions and pleadings; 
 
7. Mr. Hawkins continues to object to my office providing any legal 
assistance whatsoever; 
 
8. I cannot provide any further assistance to the Court of [sic] client 
in this matter. There is a conflict of interest under the rules and I 
must  withdraw as attorney of record. 
 
R. p. 365-366. 
 
On May 18, 2016, appointed counsel filed another notice of lodging of 
pleadings of Faron Hawkins. (R. p. 367.)  This included an affidavit detailing the 
supposed failings of appointed counsel. (R. p. 369-371.)  On June 1, 2016, 
appointed counsel filed yet another notice of lodging pleadings of Faron Hawkins. 
(R. p. 405.) 
On June 1, 2016, appointed counsel filed his supplemental petition for 
post-conviction relief which included claims which were to be added to, and not 
replace, Mr. Hawkins’ pro se claims. (R. p. 546-550.) 
                                            
1 Appointed counsel characterized it as 33 claims. (R. p. 647.) 
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On October 19, 2016, the court issued its notice of intent to dismiss. (R. p. 
610.) The court did so because it would be dismissing claims on other than the 
state’s grounds.  (R. p. 627.) 
The court then explained the various reasons it would be dismissing all of 
the claims, which it succinctly stated in its conclusion: 
. . . Despite the numerous filings, Hawkins has failed to come 
forward with admissible evidence to make a prima facie claim for 
post-conviction relief; therefore as a matter of law, the Court will 
summarily dismiss his petition. Hawkins himself acted as his own 
attorney; therefore, he does not have an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. His due process  claim regarding the failure to serve 
subpoenas should have been raised on appeal. It is also bare and 
conclusory, unsupported by admissible evidence. His claims that he 
was denied due process of law when the trial court held a 
retroactive competency hearing and allowed him to proceed to trial 
without counsel were both barred by res judicata. His other claims 
either were or should have been raised in appeal. His claim 
regarding jail conditions is not properly before this court and his 
claim regarding parole eligibility is not appropriate in this type of 
case. Hawkins failed to make a prima facie showing of a claim for 
post-conviction relief and his application for postconviction relief will 
be summarily dismissed. 
 
R.  p. 638. 
On October 31, 2016, appointed counsel filed “Another Motion to 
Withdraw” and requested a hearing.  (R. p. 639.) 
After receiving an enlargement of time, on November 22, 2016, appointed 
counsel also filed an objection to the court’s notice of intent to dismiss and 
memorandum in support regarding the three claims in the supplemental petition.  
(R. p. 644, 645, 647-655.) 
On December 21, 2016, the court issued its one page Order Dismissing 
Petition which contained no further analysis. (R. p  657.)  A separate judgment 
was entered. (R. p. 659.) 
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Whether the district court erred by denying the motion to withdraw as counsel 
and then by failing to rule on or even hold a hearing on appointed counsel’s 




Whether the court erred when it failed to take judicial notice of the underlying 





The District Court Erred by Not Allowing Appointed Counsel to Withdraw as 
Counsel and Then by Failing to Hear or Rule on Counsel’s Repeated 
Motions to Withdraw   
 As explained above, appointed counsel brought a motion to withdraw as 
counsel. At the hearing, the court stated that its practice was to appoint counsel 
where there had been a jury trial.  Further, the court stated that in this case the 
petition was incoherent. (Tr. p. 11-12.)  The court repeatedly suggested that 
appointed counsel could file an amended petition. (Tr. p. 14.) 
 Mr. Hawkins personally addressed the court and objected because 
according to him, appointed counsel refused to see him even once and while Mr. 
Hawkins had called him many times,  he had only talked to him once.   Also, 
appointed counsel had refused to file any documents including those which Mr. 
Hawkins received from his former appellate attorney. Finally, he requested that 
said former appellate attorney be appointed. (Tr. p. 15.)  
 The following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: . . . .  I don’t see a benefit to you in post-conviction 
proceedings to deprive yourself of knowledgeable assistance. And I 
would like to see if we can’t get this to maybe work out. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I would object then and ask you to appoint 
another public defender for me.  
 
THE COURT: Well, if counsel reviews his records and determines 
that there is some kind of conflict, I think counsel is experienced 
and knows what to do.  But I’m not—no one has a right when it’s 
appointed counsel to have a particular appointed counsel. It doesn’t 
work that way.  
 




THE COURT: And like I said, at this point I don’t think that’s  
prudent.   And I would like to see if things can’t get worked out.  At 
some later date, we might see where we are.  At least at this point, 
you ought to have some more skillful assistance, so that if you have 
some real issues that they get properly raised, so they don’t get 
overlooked.   
    . . . 
 
THE COURT: . . . .  And I want to encourage you right now  to see 
if you can’t work it out with counsel.   I will—I am not barring you 
forever from this. I just think it will help you at this stage to have a 
legal and trained person to talk to and write out or write to and 
layout what you think your problems are so that you have a better 
chance  of presenting legitimate issues you have in a good way so 
it doesn’t harm you.  
 
So I would like to give it a try for now. I’m not barring it. I am not 
barring something to change later.  But at this point I am not going 
to grant the motion to withdraw.  I will see if we can sort it out.  . . .  
 
Tr. p. 21, ln. 11—p. 23, ln. 20. 
 
 Contrary to what the court stated, its denial of the motion to withdraw was 
a complete bar. Counsel filed another four motions to withdraw as counsel and 
the court never ruled on them or even had a hearing despite requests.   
 To begin with, the court erred by failing to allow counsel to withdraw. The  
court did place appointed counsel in an untenable position where he had to 
review Mr. Hawkins’ filings and, if appropriate, file them, when those filings 
themselves contained Mr. Hawkins’ complaints against appointed counsel.  If 
appointed counsel failed to file the documents Mr. Hawkins would no doubt 
believe he was hiding them to protect himself. Yet if he filed them, appointed 
counsel  would be required to provide the court with his client’s complaints 
against himself.  Further, one of the filings actually showed appointed counsel 
had been named in a lawsuit by Mr. Hawkins, creating a clear conflict.  
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 While it may very well have been more convenient for the district court to 
have an attorney to deal with instead of Mr. Hawkins himself (although Judge 
McLaughlin and the Supreme Court had to deal with a pro se Mr. Hawkins),  this 
cannot justify creating that sort of adversarial relationship between attorney and 
client.   
 Even assuming arguendo that the court was correct in denying the first 
motion to withdraw as counsel, it nevertheless erred when it refused to ever 
consider the subsequent requests to withdraw or to even hold a hearing. As 
pointed out above, appointed counsel moved to withdraw another four times, 
some of the motions attaching Mr. Hawkins’ requests/demands that he withdraw 
and to either appoint substitute counsel or allow him to proceed pro se.  
 Further, Mr. Hawkins repeatedly requested a hearing following the Court 
of Appeals case  of  State v. Bias, 341 P.3d 1264 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014). While 
that was a criminal case, it is nonetheless instructive to our case.  In Bias, the 
Supreme Court explained that the right to inquiry into substitute counsel  had a 
due process component even in a post-conviction case.   
Finally, some inquiry may be guaranteed by procedural due 
process. See Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342, 160 P.3d 
1275 (Ct. App. 2007) (The post-conviction petitioner did not enjoy a 
constitutionally-protected right to counsel; nonetheless, the court 
considered whether an inquiry was sufficient under general 
procedural due process principles. Although the right to an inquiry 
cases were not binding precedent, they were discussed as 
persuasive authority.). 
 
Id. p. 1267.  
 
 While the court obviously hoped at the hearing that things would work 
themselves out between Mr. Hawkins and appointed counsel, this clearly did not 
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happen.  Both Mr. Hawkins and appointed counsel continued to request 
appointed counsel be allowed to withdraw and either substitute counsel 
appointed or Mr. Hawkins be allowed to proceed pro se. Additionally, appointed 
counsel repeatedly requested a hearing.  
The court’s response to all this was to ignore it and not rule on any of the 
subsequent motions to withdraw or even hold a hearing.  Since the duty to 
inquire was triggered, the court erred by doing nothing. Accordingly, this matter 
must be reversed and remanded for either appointment of substitute counsel or 




The Court Erred When It Failed to Take Judicial Notice of the Underlying  
Criminal Case so There Was Actually No Record Upon Which  
the Court Could  Base Its Dismissal 
 
The notice of intent to dismiss contained 14 pages detailing the procedure 
of the criminal case.  (R. p. 611-625.)   Unfortunately, the district court mostly did 
not cite to where in the record the information it related exists.  In fact, there are 
only a total of six citations to pleadings, filed items and/or transcripts in the 
criminal case in those 14 pages.  Of those, it appears only one item is in the 
post-conviction record, to wit, the transcript of the competency hearing, which 
had been filed as an attachment  by appointed counsel. (R. p. 620-621.)  In other 
words, while the post-conviction court was clearly familiar with the criminal case 
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record, it was not made a part of the instant case.2   The court never even took 
judicial notice of the specific documents and suppression hearing transcript as 
requested by the state.  While Mr. Hawkins attached various criminal case 
documents to his post-conviction filings, they were very limited and certainly did 
not include the entire criminal case record, or even a fraction thereof.  
 The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644 
(Ct.App. 1994): 
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal 
case from which it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in 
which the applicant bears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil 
plaintiff.  No part of the record from the criminal case becomes part 
of the record in the post-conviction proceeding unless it is entered 
as a exhibit. Transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, the trial, and 
sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if previously prepared 
as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial 
court in the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part of 
the record on appeal unless presented as exhibits.   . . . 
 
Id. p. 648 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 In short, since the district court failed to take judicial notice of the criminal 
case proceedings and the entire record (or even more than a fraction of it)  was 
not otherwise made part of the post-conviction, there was actually no record 
upon which the district court could base its dismissal. Accordingly, the dismissal 




                                            
2 While the district court did quote and cite to the various published opinions and 
some of what happened below can be gleaned from them, by no means did the 






Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court’s order summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief be reversed and remanded to the district court 
for appointment of substitute counsel or for Mr. Hawkins to proceed pro se and 
for a proper record to be created.   
DATED this 22nd  day of June, 2017.      
       
/s/ Greg S. Silvey ___ 
      Greg S. Silvey 
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